CSUF Republicans allege professor-on-student assault at Trump protest

Members of the Cal State Fullerton GOP club say that an anthropology professor physically attacked students yesterday during an on-campus clash with anti-Trump protestors. The Register and Breitbart have the stories.

It’s too early to tell if any of this is true. But that doesn’t mean we can’t tell you what will happen next.

CSUF administration will announce that they’ve called in an “independent investigator” who is really just an on-call attorney, hired to minimize the school’s liability and facilitate the quiet payoffs of any lawsuits.

The employee will be placed on paid administrative leave until the media and the students become tired of silence and move on to something else. Some sort of internal investigation may occur, but the findings will be hidden from the public and any students who were harmed.

The CSUF police force, part of the same beaurocratic structure that is responsible for this madness, will ultimately find no reason to press criminal charges upon their coworker.

During this excercise, pretense of concern for student safety will be audibly reiterated, but realistically disgarded. The administrators will focus all of their energy balancing the nearly unlimited employment rights of potentially abusive faculty with their need to protect the reputation of the institution that allowed this assault to occur.

Nevertheless, we persevere. Stick around, friends. We’ll keep a close eye on this one.

Chronic Failure CSUF Education Uber Alles Law N Disorder

35 thoughts on “CSUF Republicans allege professor-on-student assault at Trump protest

  1. Yes, we’ve seen this tale before.

    However, given the propensity of Trump’s bonehead supporters to acts of physical rebuke there may actually be more to this story.

  2. The problem I have with this is that only two sources reported on it. The Register and Breitbart. In particular Breitbart does not give a single account from one of the parties and does not even say it attempted do so. One march was scheduled to coincide with the other. I agree with Fullerton Harpoon that is too early to make anything out of it

  3. Except for the fact that the professor does appear to be gearing up to take a swing and was prevented from doing so by the man in the orange shirt. Attempting to physically harm another person meets the legal definition of assault. Breitbart.com squandered all the goodwill I had toward Andrew years ago but they do have photographic evidence to back up their claim.

    1. Ok, if there is not anything else to it . Breitbart depicts one person from one of the parties assaulted someone from the other. There was not provocation-which would mitigate but not condone- and a good spirited marcher just restrained the alleged assailant. Very rosy from the one side reporting it. It is possible that just happened like that, but I would rather give it more time

      1. Breitbart says the dude hit a kid in the face. OC Rag says no one was injured. Sort of hard to reconcile those two statements. Getting punched ion the face hurts and causes injury.

  4. FPD lost another one recently…..Officer Timothy Gibert…. You may remember Gibert as one of the officers first on scene at the drunk hit and run by Joe Felzzzzzzz.
    Gilbert recently had the San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department pay him a visit at his home in Victorville. It was no super bowl party, they had a search warrant to search for embezzled property and evidence from Home Depot. It seems Gibert has a close relative living with him who was an employee of Home Depot. The scam was to purchase home depot merchandise using the employee discount then refund the same merchandise pocketing the difference. The total about of transactions could be as much as 100k.

    With the criminal case pending, Gibert resigned from Fullerton PD this week. I’m sure hoping this case will blow over and he can get hired by another police department without a termination on his employment record. After all he knows people who know people.

    Fun fact: Timothy Gibert is the godson of FPD Lt. Mike Chocek. I’ts been said that Lt. Chocek’s head had to by surgically removed from the rectum of Danny Hughes when Hughes reported for duty at Disneyland.

    Good luck Officer Gibert, your expertise in DUI arrests will be missed.

    1. “The total about of transactions could be as much as 100k.”

      Wow, that’s a lot of orange, five-gallon Homer buckets.

    2. Why would Gibert resign for the alleged crimes of a person living in his house? I can’t fathom it unless he’s guilty too.

  5. New Flash:
    The Fullerton Police Department internal affairs or PSB unit is currently conducting an internal investigation concerning the same Directed Enforcement Team (DET) who was tasked with surveilling and arresting AJ Redkey.

    According to reports, the DET team may have used their surveillance skills and city resources to gain intelligence on a suspected two-timing, ex-lover-partner of a current FPD Lieutenant.

    We have seen this type of law enforcement assited staking in Orange County in the past.

    http://behindthebluewall.blogspot.com/2010/04/ca-costa-mesa-officer-parsons-charged.html

    The DET is a unit created by Dan Hughes. It’s members hand picked by Dan Hughes…to conduct all kinds of investigations deemed worthy by Dan Hughes.

    Who are the cops in this unit? Guys who can be trusted to keep their mouths shut… and their reward?

    Unlimited overtime.

    1. FPD misuses surveillance and violates citizens privacy rights with the same ease my 9 year old nephew plays Super Mario Bros games

    2. There is in fact an Amish person on the DET team. He is big tall fella, with anger issues, a fake beard, a small vocabulary, and the constant smell of boiled eggs around him. He personally took down most of the 15 arrested, at or after, the protest. He also lead the successful raid on Pasadena to capture Fullerton’s most dangerous criminal …. AJ Redkey. It was a big waste of time and our tax dollars, as after a week long jury trial deadlocked the judge dismissed all charges against AJ and his co-defendant PM Beers. . DET stands of Duchy Eggomenical Turds. These are the same guys who beat up autistic kids, called girls who would not fuck them sluts, and cheated of off the rest of us while in high school. So glad Dan Hughes put them all together on the same team. That’s exactly what the good citizens of Fullerton need.

      1. DET was the same Unit that other POS Bybee (JR) was working when he ran over the bicyclist. Can’t imagine why someone would stop for an unmarked car… another great idea of Danny Boy’s

    3. “He brought a level of professionalism and passion and reform to the department,” City Manager Joe Felz said in a statement. “He was the right man for the job. His legacy will extend for decades.”
      Hughes said that he was asked to stay on at Fullerton PD as a reserve police officer to finish up “a few projects”.
      Just how much is the City of Fullerton paying Dan Hughes to be a “Reserve Police Officer”?

      1. Nepotism? Unbelievable, Chocek was in “professional standards” with the other POS, Tony Diaz. Those two swept more stuff under the rug then my maid! Luckily Diaz can’t promote any further because he only has a GED.

        1. When word got out (I never filed a report myself) that I was receiving threats and being harassed by members of FPD at the height of the Kelly Thomas beating death case (i.e. what would normally be referred to as a murder) it was Tony Diaz that was assigned to look into it. No one here will be surprised that nothing happened.

      2. Fullerton Police Department:
        Audit of Force Reviews and
        Internal Investigations
        August 2016
        Michael Gennaco and Julie Ruhlin
        323-821-0586
        7142 Trask Avenue | Playa del Rey, CA 90293
        OIRGroup.com
        1
        Introduction
        It has been four years since OIR Group completed its first review of the Fullerton
        Police Department. In that time, the Department has been committed to reform,
        measured in part by its progress toward implementing the 59 recommendations we
        laid out in our August 2012 report.
        The changes the Department has made have been wide-ranging and broad. Not
        only do they respond to critical – and particularly germane – concerns about
        engagement with homeless individuals and those in mental health crisis, but they
        also cover topics, such as effective evidence preservation, that are key building
        blocks for sound law enforcement. Additionally, recent years have seen
        worthwhile initiatives that increase the Department’s positive interactions with the
        Fullerton community. Taken together, these steps reflect a conscientious agency
        that continues to evolve in the right direction.
        This report, though, focuses on a more narrow set of reforms, dealing with the
        ways in which the FPD investigates and reviews uses of force by and allegations
        of misconduct against its officers. On these subjects, our 2012 report detailed 18
        recommendations. For this report, we reviewed a sampling of use of force reviews
        and IA investigations, and then used those incidents and investigations as a
        window through which to gauge the Department’s progress.
        2
        Our review did not include any critical incidents or tragic outcomes – there were
        no officer-involved shootings by FPD officers or any in-custody deaths during the
        time frame of this review. Accordingly, our review is focused on less significant
        uses of force and on allegations of misconduct ranging from discourtesy during
        calls for service to questionable practices during vehicle pursuits.
        Our examination of the documentation, investigation, and Department assessment
        of these events is an important barometer for how the Department may handle the
        next critical incident. Without the proper mechanisms and processes in place to
        effectively address these less significant events, the Department could find itself
        destined to repeat its past failings when it might again have to confront a serious
        tragedy.
        Moreover, and to its credit, FPD has reached out to OIR Group when it was
        weighing allegations of more significant misconduct committed by its employees
        so that we could provide an outside review of the investigation and an independent
        perspective on the appropriate outcome. This demonstrated commitment to
        hearing from outside voices as it considers issues such as investigative
        thoroughness, objectivity, and accountability sets the FPD apart from many other
        law enforcement agencies.
        Fortunately, we find that the FPD has used the past five years as a learning
        experience and a springboard toward systemic reforms. The leadership of the
        Department has embraced the City’s goal of establishing the FPD as a model of
        progressive policing. The recommendations we made in 2012 are an important
        step toward that goal. Our review of cases from 2014 demonstrates that the
        Department has done much to address those recommendations. Nonetheless, we
        found cases that demonstrate our recommendations have not yet been fully
        implemented and others that show there is room for further improvement. We
        discuss those cases in this report, and make follow-up recommendations where we
        think the Department could benefit from changes to its policies or practices.
        Our assessments and this report were greatly enhanced by the full cooperation of
        the FPD. In addition to providing us complete access to documents, policies,
        personnel, meetings, and events, the Chief and his team have been uniformly
        candid and helpful to us as we have conducted our audit and review. The
        Department’s open approach to access helped make our work more efficient; more
        importantly, its receptivity has helped make that work more productive and useful
        to the citizens that FPD serves.
        3
        Scope of Review
        Since our initial systemic audit, this report is the first report setting out the results
        of OIR Group’s review of investigations and historical audits of complaints, force
        reviews and administrative investigations. Pursuant to our agreement with the
        City of Fullerton, OIR Group is responsible for conducting real-time review of
        investigations and providing recommendations for internal findings on all uses of
        deadly force, in-custody death investigations, significant force investigations, and
        any other internal investigation that the Chief of Police or City Manager request us
        to review. In addition, we conduct historical audits of all bias-based policing
        complaints, all internal investigations in which the subject employee is the rank of
        Sergeant or higher, and random audits of all uses of force reviews and
        administrative investigations.
        Real-Time Consultation
        During the audit period, the Chief of Police consulted OIR Group regarding two
        significant Internal Affairs investigations while those matters were still pending.
        This included his forwarding the internal investigative report for our review prior
        to making a decision on the disposition of the case. The allegations involved
        serious breaches of trust and unprofessional conduct by two officers, one on-duty
        and the other off-duty, and eventually resulted in serious administrative
        repercussions for those officers.
        The real-time review process afforded OIR Group the opportunity to evaluate the
        internal investigation for thoroughness and objectivity prior to its completion; we
        also provided recommendations on potential additional investigation, outcomes
        4
        and appropriate discipline. While he retained the final decision-making authority,
        the discussions we had with the Chief during this process added an experienced
        and independent outside perspective to his deliberations.
        As we have during our prior work with the FPD, we found the Chief to be candid,
        thoughtful, and receptive during these exchanges. The Chief’s willingness to
        embrace outside input in an effort to strengthen the FPD process is reflective of his
        progressive approach – and a phenomenon that would have been unheard of in
        Fullerton just a few years ago.
        Historical Audits
        For this report, we received materials concerning all 51 use of force reviews and
        77 administrative investigations conducted by the FPD in 2014. Of these, we
        selected 17 use of force reviews and 22 administrative investigations, roughly a
        third of the total in each category. We selected the cases to represent a variety of
        different types of complaints, allegations, and force used. For these cases, we
        reviewed all of the Department’s investigative materials, including written reports,
        interviews, and Digital Audio Recordings. In addition, we talked with Department
        personnel regarding questions that were not addressed in the written materials, and
        observed the Chief interact with his staff on the review of force and administrative
        investigations.
        Our analysis centers on the quality and thoroughness of the Department’s internal
        investigation and review of each of the incidents presented. We look at relevant
        training and policy issues, and corrective actions initiated by the FPD. Without
        opining on the final outcomes as to whether individual policy violations occurred,
        we focus instead on the quality of the investigation and review process. Where we
        find issues that were not addressed or thoroughly examined, we suggest ways the
        Department can better handle these matters in the future.
        5
        Reviewing
        Uses of Force
        n officer’s authority to use force comes with a significant responsibility
        to use it judiciously and only when reasonably necessary. It is essential
        that a law enforcement agency critically review and evaluate each force
        incident in order to determine whether the use of force complies with
        Departmental expectations as set out by policy and reinforced in training. An
        effective inquiry, however, does not end there. The Department should also assess
        force incidents for potential issues with performance, training, tactics, equipment,
        policy, or supervision. This requires a commitment to comprehensive factgathering
        and dispassionate review. Such a holistic review of force incidents will
        increase the tactical and decision-making capabilities of officers, provide
        strategies and tactics to resolve issues without resorting to force, promote
        accountability, and leave the Department with better options to address
        tomorrow’s challenges – a goal of any progressive law enforcement organization.
        For our 2012 report, we reviewed a random sample of force investigations
        conducted by Internal Affairs, a process we replicate in Section Two of this report,
        while also examining other types of IA investigations. For this report, we also
        reviewed a sampling of investigations into so-called “lower level” force incidents
        – those conducted by field sergeants following force encounters that did not
        warrant an investigation by Internal Affairs, either because the force used was
        A
        SECTION ONE
        6
        minor or because the incident was deemed straightforward enough so as not to
        warrant a more exacting inquiry.
        The FPD generally does a very good job collecting all relevant facts necessary to
        fully evaluate even these lower level uses of force. Its force reporting is consistent
        with or better than the general standards employed by most police agencies of
        similar size. The manner in which it reviews and scrutinizes these uses of force
        likewise is on par with other similar agencies we have assessed, and exceeds many
        in its rigor and scope.
        Nevertheless, our aim is to help the FPD continue to evolve in its efforts to set a
        “gold standard” for agencies of its size. The observations and recommendations in
        this report are made with that objective. Our assessment of the way in which FPD
        documents, reviews, and evaluates force incidents is largely complimentary, but
        we nonetheless look for and identify ways the Department can improve its
        capacity to analyze these incidents to maximize learning opportunities, to identify
        institutional shortcomings, or to reinforce positive practices.
        In this section, then, we address these areas of potential improvement as they arise
        in the context of uses of force that do not generate Internal Affairs investigations.
        We examine IA investigations – and the FPD’s implementation of
        recommendations set forth in our 2012 report – in the following section.
        Reporting and Documenting Force
        When an FPD officer uses force on a subject, he or she documents the force and
        the precipitating circumstances on a “General Offense” report that primarily is
        intended to document the facts surrounding the subject’s arrest. Officers who
        witnessed but did not use force may document their observations on a
        supplemental report that becomes part of the arrest report. A supervising sergeant
        then prepares a “Supervisor’s Use of Force/Prisoner Injury Review” that
        documents some important data points about the force (i.e., nature of initial
        contact and type of force used), summarizes the event based on reports from the
        officers and statements from the subject and witnesses, and provides the
        supervisor’s conclusions about the incident. The package is routed to the watch
        commander and the division commander, who indicate their concurrence with the
        supervisor’s conclusions. Unless a force incident generates an Internal Affairs
        7
        investigation for any of a number of reasons (see below), this is the only
        documented review of the incident the Department conducts.
        The inclusion of force documentation in the general arrest report is an
        understandable way to conserve time and other resources, but is limiting in some
        respects. One document must serve dual purposes – providing the legal basis for
        prosecution of an individual while also providing a meaningful level of detail
        regarding the force officers used while effectuating his arrest – so that the force
        documentation could in some cases slide into a position of secondary importance.
        Nonetheless, we generally found officers’ documentation of their force to be well
        written and sufficiently descriptive to allow the reader to understand the sequence
        of events. We also found that force reviews generally gather all relevant
        information. Sergeants either interview subjects – and record those interviews –
        or document why they did not. The same is true for civilian witnesses. Sergeants
        listen to officers’ digitally activated recorders (DARs).1 Subjects’ and officers’
        injuries are photographed. Where the Taser was used, sergeants download and
        review the Taser data. These are all markers of complete and thorough
        investigations.
        However, the sampling of cases we reviewed revealed some room for
        improvement. In the few instances we found where descriptive detail was lacking
        in an officer’s written report (where, for example, an officer writes something like,
        “I subdued the subject to the ground”), there was no evident follow-up or kick
        back from the supervisor to ask the involved officer to provide a more substantive
        detailed description of the force used.
        In some cases, officers who witnessed force did not prepare a supplemental report
        to describe what they witnessed. Those supplemental reports generally seemed to
        be written only when an officer had something substantive to add to the arrest
        report and not as a stand-alone report of witnessed force. Similarly, while in most
        cases reviewing sergeants interviewed any civilian witnesses to the force, we
        found one case where an officer from another law enforcement agency was present
        during a use of force but was neither interviewed nor asked to write a report.
        1 As noted in further detail below, subsequent to this review period, FPD outfitted all of
        its patrol officers with body-worn cameras, becoming the first police agency in Orange
        County to do so.
        8
        Recommendation 1: Officers who witness a use of force should be
        required to prepare a supplemental report to describe what they
        witnessed.
        Recommendation 2: The sergeant preparing the Supervisor’s Use of
        Force/Prisoner Injury Review should be required to interview or get
        written statements from all non-FPD personnel who witnessed the
        incident, including all civilians and members of other law enforcement
        agencies.
        One of the most significant issues we identified was a failure to reconcile
        inconsistencies between a subject’s assertions and an officer’s written report.
        Where there were differences in those accounts, the sergeants responsible for the
        reports did not document efforts to acknowledge or account for those
        discrepancies. For example, in one incident a subject reported that the arresting
        officer “shoved his face into the ground” following a foot pursuit, but then said it
        was “no big deal” and the officer probably was just mad at him for running. He
        went on to say that the officer had not done anything wrong, and that he “probably
        deserved it.” The officer’s report does not mention any use of force, and the
        sergeant preparing the Use of Force/Prisoner Injury Review did not question the
        officer about the subject’s claim, despite the fact he noted abrasions on the
        subject’s face. Instead, the sergeant noted it was inconclusive whether the
        abrasions were “self-inflicted” when the subject went to the ground at the end of
        the pursuit, or were the result of a use of force. The sergeant relied on the fact the
        subject did not make a formal complaint and downplayed the injury to conclude
        that the officer’s conduct was proper. These kinds of inconsistencies between
        officers’ and subjects’ accounts may not always be resolvable, but sergeants
        should document their attempts, including follow up conversations they have with
        involved officers.
        Recommendation 3: In cases where the subject’s account of any force
        used varies significantly from the officer’s account, the reviewing
        sergeant should strive to resolve the conflict using all relevant
        investigative tools, including interviews of the involved or witness
        officers.
        Finally, we reviewed a number of cases where on-scene sergeants witnessed,
        directed, or were involved in the use of force and then nonetheless were
        responsible for writing the use of force review and drawing conclusions about the
        9
        propriety of the force. For example, in one case we reviewed, the sergeant
        responded to a vandalism call along with three officers. They ultimately
        apprehended the suspect, with the sergeant participating in taking him down and
        securing him. The involved sergeant then was responsible for writing the Use of
        Force/Prisoner Injury Review, which concluded the force used was proper. In
        another incident, an on-scene sergeant directed an officer to fire a sponge gun at a
        mentally ill subject holding a knife. The less-lethal round missed but nonetheless
        caused the subject to drop the knife. The sergeant who directed the use of force
        prepared the written review and, not surprisingly, found the force in policy.
        We do not mean to suggest that the force used in either of these cases was
        improper, and we understand that the sergeant’s conclusion is reviewed by a
        lieutenant and captain who may disagree with their subordinate’s conclusions
        about the propriety of the force. Nonetheless, the sergeant’s involvement in this
        first level of decision making creates an obvious obstacle to objectivity, as no
        sergeant is likely to find force he or she directed or participated in to be
        unreasonable or out of policy. Additionally, there may be factors or
        considerations overlooked by an involved sergeant that may be clear to one who
        was not engaged in the incident and may lead to a more complete and objective
        review. At a minimum, incidents in which a sergeant either used or directed force
        should be assigned to an uninvolved sergeant or lieutenant for investigation and
        review and to make the initial recommendation about whether that force was
        within policy.
        Recommendation 4: In cases where a sergeant uses or directs a use
        of force, the Department should assign the task of preparing the
        Supervisor’s Use of Force/Prisoner Injury Review to an uninvolved
        sergeant or lieutenant.
        Reviewing and Evaluating Force
        The Supervisor’s Use of Force/Prisoner Injury Review generally contains all of
        the relevant information necessary to evaluate a use of force (with the exceptions
        noted above), but is not a particularly useful tool for analyzing the force. The
        sergeant’s summary of the event (which likely takes a considerable amount of time
        to write) simply re-tells the story that officers have written in their reports.
        Sergeants also summarize their interviews of subjects and witnesses, in what are
        10
        also often sizable narratives. The supervisor’s conclusion, however, is generally
        one paragraph and includes little analysis of the incident.
        After the sergeant has completed his or her work on the use of force review, the
        Watch Commander (generally a lieutenant) and Division Commander review the
        package, and complete simple check boxes (“in policy/potentially out of policy”)
        and (“concur? yes/no”) to indicate they have reviewed the documentation. The
        higher-ranking officers concurred with the sergeants in each of the incidents we
        reviewed. Without exception among the incidents we reviewed, the sergeant
        concluded that the officers’ conduct was reasonable, necessary, and within policy,
        and the Watch Commander and Division Commander agreed.
        We have no quarrel with any particular outcome, and understand that if a
        commander believed the force potentially violated Department policy, he would
        not sign off on the report and would instead initiate an Internal Affairs
        investigation. However, the rote quality of the written conclusions absent any
        documentation of further analysis creates a concern that the process of approving
        the use of force could become too shallow.
        With every use of force, there are questions that should be answered by the written
        documentation of the incident, where applicable. A supervisor or higher-level
        executive performing a rigorous review of the incident should know the answers
        before concluding the force was within policy and in order to determine whether
        alternative strategies could have been deployed short of force. This information
        includes:
        • What were the officer’s words, gestures or actions prior to, during, and
        after the time he/she used force?
        • Was there any relevant prior “interaction” or “relationship” between the
        officers using force and the person against whom force was subsequently
        used?
        • What was the physical or mental condition of the person against whom
        force was used?
        • Was there a reasonable opportunity to safely de-escalate the incident in
        order to lessen the likelihood of the need to use force or to reduce the level
        11
        of force necessary? If so, did the officer using force attempt to do so? If
        not, what was the reason?2
        • Was there a reasonable opportunity to safely use tactical options such as
        increasing time and distance, using cover and concealment, using or
        creating barriers, calling and waiting for additional personnel, etc., which
        might have lessened the likelihood of the need to use force or reduce the
        level of force necessary? If so, did the officer attempt to do so? If not, what
        was the reason?
        • What was the underlying offense, infraction, or conduct that precipitated
        the initial contact and the subsequent use of force?
        • Was the force used reasonable when compared to the threat posed and all
        other surrounding circumstances?
        • Was there a reasonable opportunity to safely use a weapon, device,
        instrumentality, or force technique that might lessen the force needed to
        overcome the threat posed? If so, did the officer attempt to do so? If not,
        what was the reason?
        • Once the use of force commenced, was it reasonably decreased or stopped
        as the level of resistance/threat/harm decreased or stopped?
        • Was there any evidence indicating that the force used by the officer was
        motivated in whole or in part by any improper purpose such as, but not
        limited to, punishment, retaliation, discrimination, bias, improper coercion,
        infliction of unnecessary pain, harassment, ridicule, abuse or any other
        improper reason?
        • Did involved and witness officers notify a supervisor of the force incident
        in a timely way?
        • Did involved and witness officers promptly write reports that thoroughly
        answered all relevant questions about the incident?
        2 The consideration of de-escalation techniques is gaining purchase by police executives
        and law enforcement agencies as part of the necessary evaluation of officer conduct in
        force incidents. In just the past few months, the Police Executive Research Forum has
        encouraged law enforcement to consider the use of de-escalation techniques in assessing
        force incidents and the Los Angeles Police Department’s Police Commission has ordered
        that the principles be incorporated into the Department’s use of force policy.
        12
        • Did the involved or witness officers have access to any video of the
        incident prior to writing their reports?
        • Were the officers’ written reports consistent with each other, and with any
        video of the incident? If not, account for and/or explain these
        inconsistencies.
        • Were the officers’ written reports consistent with inmate and witness
        interviews? If not, account for and/or explain these inconsistencies.
        • Was the person against whom force was used provided prompt medical
        assessment and care?
        • What was the nature and extent of any injuries to the person against whom
        force was used?
        • What was the nature and extent of any injuries sustained by the involved
        officer(s)?
        • Were the injuries noted and/or documented by medical providers consistent
        with the level of force reported?
        Further, expanding the simple in policy/out of policy determination on the force
        review documentation to include some additional questions about tactics and
        training would provide a mechanism for recording and tracking issues surrounding
        a particular use of force or investigation that do not rise to the level of a policy
        violation. By focusing only on the question of whether the use of force was within
        policy, the supervisors reviewing that force at all levels may miss the opportunity
        to scrutinize the incident for other purposes and through different prisms.
        For example, we reviewed a number of force incidents that were preceded by foot
        pursuits. In each, the force was considered to be within policy and there was no
        written record of an evaluation of the officers’ decision to pursue. In other cases,
        officers deployed Tasers that proved ineffective, yet once the application of the
        Taser was found to be within policy, there was no record of the Department’s
        evaluation of why it did not work. Finally, there was one case where a police
        canine’s incessant barking was documented as a distraction in the interviews of
        civilian subjects and witnesses during a vehicle stop, yet there was no documented
        evidence that the Department ever considered or devised remedial action so that
        future interactions would not be similarly compromised.
        13
        Reviewing these incidents from the perspectives of tactics, training, supervision,
        and equipment may lead to a meaningful assessment of officer or agency
        shortcomings that should be addressed in non-punitive ways. Or they could lead
        the Department to identify effective practices that it could then reinforce in
        briefings for the benefit of the entire organization. In short, looking beyond the
        “bottom line” issue of legal justification for force creates potential learning
        opportunities with each force incident.
        Through our conversations with Department members and attendance at a staff
        meeting conducted by the Chief, we understand that these issues frequently are
        discussed between the Chief and his operations and training staff. That level of
        attention to all of the circumstances surrounding a force incident is commendable.
        Any remedial measures coming out of these discussions, however are not
        documented as part of the force review, making it difficult for the Department’s
        outside reviewers to understand clearly how the Department’s own internal review
        assessed a given incident and failing to create a paper trail to demonstrate that
        command staff is attentive to force incidents from a risk management and civil
        litigation perspective.
        One way to develop a more well-documented exacting review of force incidents
        while at the same time ensuring that all the relevant facts are gathered is to employ
        detailed checklists that specifically lay out the Department’s expectations for
        investigation and review. Such a tool could help ensure uniform and thorough
        coverage of the fact collection and review process, prompting supervisors to ask
        the right questions and confirm that the final force review package provides an
        answer at each level of investigation and review. For example, rather than expect
        the sergeant to prepare a narrative description of the event and then write a freeform
        conclusion that summarizes his or her reasoning on the question of whether
        the force was in policy, a checklist could walk him or her through questions about
        threat perception, de-escalation efforts, adherence to force reporting policies,
        medical review, tactical concerns, and equipment issues, such as those delineated
        above.
        Similarly, a checklist employed by watch commanders and division commanders
        could require consideration of the same issues of threat perception, force options,
        de-escalation efforts, discrepancies in reporting, and, ultimately, whether the force
        used was reasonable. By creating prompts for all levels of reviewers to verify
        certain issues are addressed and all relevant information is collected, this more
        detailed review would also ensure the elimination of some of the oversights we
        14
        saw in the force reviews we audited (missing witness interviews and witness
        officers who did not prepare written reports, for example).
        This revised force reporting and review process also would facilitate compliance
        with a number of recommendations we made in our 2012 report. In
        recommendations number 28, 29, and 32, we emphasized the importance of
        promoting alternatives to force, acknowledging officers skilled at resolving
        confrontation without force, and targeting training to recognize that certain force
        options should be used only in life-threatening situations.3 Checklist items would
        include consideration of other force options, de-escalation, and alternatives to
        force. By regularly reinforcing the Department’s philosophy on use of force with
        sergeants, lieutenants, and captains, the documents will cement them as core
        values of the Department and promote their general acceptance among all of its
        officers.
        Recommendation 5: FPD should consider changing the way it
        documents force to include specific questions about threat perception,
        de-escalation efforts, adherence to force reporting policies, medical
        review, tactical concerns, and equipment issues that the sergeant
        would complete in lieu of the free form narrative of the incident.
        3 Consistent with these recommendations, the Department has made significant
        expenditures in recent years to upgrade its training facilities and to improve scenario
        training to emphasize the skills officers need to de-escalate in situations where force
        might be justified but is not necessary.
        15
        Internal Affairs
        Investigations
        n our 2012 report, we reviewed a random sample of FPD force investigations
        by Internal Affairs. For this report, we examined IA investigations into a
        variety of allegations – some use of force and some other types of alleged
        misconduct. We looked specifically at the recommendations we made in 2012 to
        gauge the extent to which FPD has embraced those recommendations in its
        practices, but we also evaluated investigations independent of the findings in our
        prior report and make some new recommendations here.
        In general, we found the Department has substantially addressed many of the
        shortcomings we noted in our 2012 report. The internal affairs investigations we
        reviewed for this report were mostly thorough and objective. However, we found
        a number of cases where investigators did not fully explore tactical issues or
        potential policy violations that may not have been central to the incident but were
        nonetheless presented by the officers’ performance. These deficiencies with
        investigations, however, point to an issue with the Department’s processes for
        reviewing and analyzing these cases as much as they indicate a problem with
        investigators’ performance. If the Department commanders reviewing
        investigations more formally analyzed all the possible issues presented by an
        incident or allegation, they would direct a more searching and well-documented
        probe of all relevant facts. Investigators would quickly catch on to what their
        superiors expected of them, and would broaden the scope of their investigations.
        I
        SECTION TWO
        16
        Investigative Issues
        Review of 2012 Recommendations
        OIR Group made 11 recommendations specifically related to force investigations
        in its 2012 report. These were Recommendations 39 (containing eight subparts, a
        through h) through 42 (pages 33-37). In his August, 2015 response, Chief Dan
        Hughes indicated the Department’s compliance with each of these
        recommendations, noting changes to the Administrative Investigation Guide and
        policies on which personnel should be responsible for interviews and force
        investigations.
        In the investigations we reviewed for this report, we found that investigators are
        largely complying with the new guidelines and policies. Specifically relating to
        Recommendation 39:
        a. Every officer who used force or witnessed force should be interviewed.
        Update: With one exception among the cases we reviewed, investigators
        interviewed all officers who used or witnessed force in cases we reviewed.
        The one case where officers were not interviewed by the IA investigator involved
        a vehicle pursuit that ended in a fatal crash. Consistent with FPD policy in cases
        where a subject dies, an accident investigator from the FPD Traffic Bureau
        conducted a criminal investigation of the incident and interviewed the involved
        officers. The administrative investigator relied on those interviews to complete his
        work, rather than conducting his own interviews. Here, the issues surrounding the
        pursuit were straightforward and the accident investigator did a good job covering
        the relevant questions in his interview of the involved officers.
        Because the scope of an administrative investigation should be broader than a
        criminal investigation, it is generally not a good practice for IA investigators to
        defer to interviews performed for a criminal case. The criminal case examines
        only the potential criminal liability of those involved and does not focus on
        potential policy violations or issues relating to training or tactics that should be a
        subject of a thorough IA interview. For example, in an accident investigation, an
        officer’s state of mind concerning his initial decision to pursue may not be
        relevant to the facts surrounding the eventual accident but could be central to an
        administrative investigation concerning the incident. The criminal investigator
        17
        examining the accident is not likely to fully probe the issue to the degree required
        for a thorough administrative investigation. Nonetheless, we do not endorse a
        blanket rule that requires unnecessary busy work. Where, as in the one case we
        discussed above, it is clear from the criminal investigation that no further
        information is necessary, an administrative investigator should have the discretion
        to rely on that criminal investigation.
        b. When the force incident is dynamic, the force investigator should ask
        witnesses to diagram the positioning and track the movement of the
        participants. The diagram should be initialed and included in the
        investigative file.
        Update: Though the Administrative Investigation Guide instructs investigators
        to have witnesses prepare diagrams in dynamic incidents, we did not see any
        diagrams in the investigations we reviewed, though they would have been
        helpful in some cases.
        c. A preference of in-person interviews should be articulated. Should
        geography or other issues prove to be an obstacle to in-person
        interviews, that fact should be included in the investigative report.
        Update: Interviews were conducted in person in cases we reviewed.
        d. The interviewer should obtain sufficient information from participants
        and witnesses so that the force used is articulated with specificity. The
        report narrative should contain a detailed description of the officer’s
        actions.
        Update: Officers’ actions and force used was articulated with specificity.
        e. The report narrative should indicate how it is that a civilian witness
        was in a position to witness the force and whether the witness was
        known to the individual upon whom force was used, and if so, how.
        Update: Investigators provided adequate documentation of positioning and
        involvement of civilian witnesses.
        18
        f. Contact information of complainants and witnesses should be obtained
        and included in initial reports.
        Update: Investigative reports included all contact information for
        complainants and witnesses.
        g. A discussion of whether any charges were filed against the person upon
        whom force was used and the status of those charges should be
        included in the report.
        Update: Though the Administrative Investigation Guide instructs investigators
        to include information on the status of any charges brought against persons
        upon whom force was used, that information was not included in cases we
        reviewed.
        h. Instruction to investigators to refrain in the factual narrative of the
        report from characterizing or editorializing about the facts compiled in
        the case.
        Update: Investigators largely refrained from obvious editorializing in the
        cases we reviewed.
        Recommendation 40 in our 2012 report stated: “FPD should develop policy that
        would prohibit officers who used, directed, or witnessed force from interviewing
        the person upon whom force was used or civilian witnesses about the force
        incident.”
        Update: FPD did enact such a policy, and we found no instances of involved
        officers conducting interviews in the cases we reviewed.
        Recommendations 41 and 42, respectively, stated a preference for a greater
        number of force complaint investigations to be handled by the Professional
        Standards Bureau (PSB), and for the Department to no longer schedule the
        Bureau’s sergeants to regular patrol duties to facilitate compliance with the former
        recommendation.
        Update: In his August, 2015 response, Chief Hughes indicated the Department’s
        acceptance of both recommendations, stating that all major use of force
        investigations would be completed by a Professional Standards Bureau sergeant,
        19
        that a greater number of force complaint investigations would be handled by PSB,
        and that PSB sergeants would no longer be assigned collateral patrol duties.
        The need for these changes is highlighted by some of the cases we reviewed which
        pre-dated the FPD’s new staffing model. In several cases, sergeants completing
        IA investigations on force incidents or vehicle pursuits were involved in or
        witnesses to the incident. In one of these cases, the investigating sergeant
        included a section in his report for his own observations and actions, noting that he
        had monitored the broadcast of the pursuit from its start to finish. In his
        conclusion at the end of the report, he wrote, “[b]ased upon . . . my personal
        observations of the pursuit as it unfolded . . . it appears that [the officers’] actions
        during the pursuit were appropriate and consistent with Fullerton Police
        Department policy.” Since he, as a supervisor of the pursuit, would have had an
        obligation to order its termination had it not been appropriate, the investigator here
        was clearly not in a position to provide an impartial opinion on the propriety of the
        pursuit.
        While the recent staffing changes may eliminate these concerns going forward, at
        least in major use of force incidents, we believe the Department would be best
        served by making it clear that sergeants involved in or witness to any force
        incident cannot be responsible for the administrative investigation of that incident,
        just as he or she should not prepare the Supervisor’s Use of Force/Prisoner Injury
        Review. As we noted above, the sergeant’s involvement creates an obvious
        obstacle to objectivity, and these incidents should be assigned to uninvolved
        personnel for investigation. While our review demonstrated adherence to this
        tenet by FPD under the leadership of the current Chief, the creation of a written
        policy will better ensure continued compliance for FPD in the generations to
        come.
        Recommendation 6: FPD should adopt a policy prohibiting a supervisor
        who was involved in a force incident from conducting an administrative
        investigation of that incident.
        Evidence and Documentation
        The investigations we reviewed were generally thorough and complete, in that
        investigators recorded interviews of all witnesses and involved personnel;
        included excellent photos of scenes, injuries, and other evidence; attached any
        video evidence as well as dispatch recordings or other audio evidence; and
        20
        included all recordings from officers’ DARs. While there were some instances
        where investigators asked leading questions in the interviews we reviewed, none
        of these was so blatant or obvious that it would lead us to conclude the
        investigation was biased or not impartial.
        None of the cases we reviewed, however, contained transcripts of interviews.
        Transcripts are helpful for those up the chain of command responsible for
        reviewing and adjudicating cases, and while we understand the challenges of
        resource allocation, we reiterate our recommendation that the interviews and
        DARs be transcribed for all administrative investigations into significant force
        events.
        We note one minor issue regarding the form of investigative reports – a table of
        contents at the beginning of each would be useful for reviewers, and would serve
        as a sort of check-off for completeness of the file. That is, if an investigator forgot
        to include a particular audio recording or piece of documentary evidence to the
        report, his or her memory might be triggered while preparing a table of contents
        listing each exhibit and attachment.
        Investigating Citizen Complaints
        In our 2012 report, we reviewed only force investigations. For this report, we
        examined a variety of investigations, including a number of investigations into
        non-force related citizens’ complaints. We found these investigations to be
        generally regarded as serious matters to be investigated thoroughly. For example,
        in one case the complainant refused to be interviewed after initiating a personnel
        complaint alleging officers had been discourteous and discriminatory in their
        treatment, but the investigator still interviewed the two individuals listed as
        witnesses in the complainant’s written complaint. In other agencies we have
        reviewed, investigators tend to suspend their efforts when the complainant is
        uncooperative and other agencies drop the complaint investigation altogether.
        In two of the complaints alleging profiling that we reviewed, we were concerned
        about the tone and demeanor of the sergeant handling the investigations, who
        seemed to be trying to explain the officer’s conduct to the complainant rather than
        just gathering information for purposes of investigating the complaint. While it is
        an instinctive tendency for supervisors to try to explain to citizens why an officer
        may have taken certain actions, in the complaint intake process such an approach
        likely will make the complainant as though the investigator is not interested in
        21
        collecting facts but has already pre-determined the outcome. We addressed this
        issue with the Chief, who agreed with our assessment and counseled the sergeant
        regarding the proper role in handling citizen complaints.
        With respect to the evidence documented and reviewed in IA investigations, we
        note that the value of having all officers employ DARs is unquestionable. In one
        case a complainant alleged he was handcuffed for over an hour and the officer
        never explained to him why he was being detained. It was resolved when the
        DAR demonstrated he was cuffed for 12 minutes and the officer had given him an
        explanation of what was happening and why. In another case, a complainant
        alleged that an officer was rude and inappropriate. The DAR proved the allegation
        to be true and the officer was appropriately reprimanded and counseled. Neither
        of these complaints would have been easily, conclusively, or satisfactorily
        resolvable without the DAR recording.
        Since the period of our review, FPD has equipped its patrol officers with body
        worn cameras (BWCs) to replace the DARs. As the Department developed its
        policy regarding use of the BWCs, we were provided drafts and asked for our
        input. We look forward to reviewing cases that include evidence from the BWCs,
        and expect to see the same type of officer cooperation and valuable corroborating
        evidence from the video as we saw from audio recordings.
        Finally, at the conclusion of investigations that initiated as citizen complaints, the
        letters sent by the Captain to the complainants are exceptional in the amount of
        detail provided. Rather than simply sharing a conclusion and citing state law
        protecting officers’ privacy, as we have seen in other agencies, the letters sent by
        FPD outline the steps taken to investigate the complainant’s allegations as well as
        some description of what the evidence showed – the content of officers’ DARs,
        conduct that was apparent in video recordings, and witness statements, for
        example – before reporting the outcome of the complaint while also complying
        with officer privacy rights as set out in current state law.
        We often hear complaints from citizens who do not trust that a law enforcement
        agency has fairly investigated their complaints. This mistrust frequently stems
        from the fact that virtually no information is provided at the end of the process. It
        is easier to distrust the outcome of an investigation when the citizen has no
        information about the basis for that decision. The substantive letters sent by FPD
        help citizen complainants understand the reasoning behind a given outcome, and
        hopefully lead to a greater level of trust in those results.
        22
        Scope of Investigations
        In our review of IA investigations, we saw some force or vehicle pursuit cases
        where investigators did not document an examination of tactical issues
        surrounding the incident in a meaningful way. We also found a few cases where
        potential policy violations were not enumerated, adequately explored in
        interviews, or discussed in the investigative summaries. Again, we found that the
        FPD does as good or better than many agencies at not limiting the scope of its
        investigations to the most immediate questions presented – whether the force is in
        policy or whether a particular allegation can be sustained – but rather looking at all
        of the circumstances surrounding an incident. Nonetheless, we found some
        investigations that could have been more broadly scoped, to address not just the
        narrow question presented by the allegation but also the peripheral issues that can
        sometimes have great importance.
        For example, we reviewed several cases where a use of force was preceded by a
        foot pursuit. Some of these seemed potentially problematic, but investigators
        focused almost exclusively on the force, hindering our ability to evaluate that
        aspect of these events.
        In another case we reviewed, officers were performing a welfare check when they
        encountered an aggressive dog. One officer fired one round at the dog, but
        missed. The investigation evaluated the reasonableness of the shooting, and
        appropriately concluded it was within policy, but did not question the officers’
        failure to prepare for the possibility of an encounter with the dog, despite having
        been warned there was a dog that sounded “big and mean” inside. Officers
        assumed that the dog was confined to a backyard and were surprised when the dog
        entered the house through an open door. Department policy requires officers to
        develop a “reasonable contingency plan” when there is advance notice they may
        encounter a dangerous animal, but in the interviews and investigative report we
        reviewed, officers’ conduct did not appear to be scrutinized for compliance with
        this aspect of the policy.
        Review and Analysis of Investigations
        At the conclusion of each administrative investigation, the Department’s
        Command Staff present the case to the Chief during their weekly meeting and
        make recommendations on findings and disciplinary or other remedial outcomes.
        23
        The Chief serves as the ultimate decision maker. This review process appears to
        be both thorough and significant. The Chief asks pertinent questions to probe
        beyond the most basic allegations, and the group seems willing to and capable of
        having a meaningful discussion about appropriate outcomes. While we questioned
        the lack of documentation regarding much of the review and analysis of these
        incidents, we do not believe the lack of a paper record is indication of a failure to
        consider the important tactical issues raised in many force incidents. However, a
        paper trail would be helpful for purposes of outside review and could provide an
        additional benefit should any of the incidents give rise to civil litigation.
        We made seven recommendations in our 2012 report relevant to the review and
        analysis of investigations:
        Recommendation 43: FPD should improve its force review process to ensure
        that not only is the incident centrally reviewed to determine whether the force used
        was in policy but also to examine whether there was tactical decision making that
        was consistent with FPD policy and expectations.
        Update: Among the cases we reviewed, we found some where we questioned the
        degree to which the investigation and subsequent reviewers scrutinized officers’
        tactical decision making, particularly with respect to the decision to engage in foot
        pursuits. We discussed each of those cases at length with the Chief. While we
        had some disagreement with the Chief over the wisdom of the decision to pursue
        or continue pursuing in some of those cases, we left the conversation satisfied that
        the tactical issues had been thoroughly considered, albeit not documented. We
        also gained an understanding of the Chief’s position and an appreciation for the
        level of scrutiny he and his staff had given these incidents.
        Recommendation 44: FPD’s force review should also consistently reinforce
        officer conduct that is consistent with or surpasses the Department’s expectations
        through formal or informal commendations.
        Update: The review structure the Department has in place can and does
        appropriately acknowledge exceptional performance, consistent with this
        recommendation.
        Recommendation 45: At the end of the force review, officers involved in every
        force incident should be debriefed regarding how the Department considered the
        handling of the incident including the tactical decision making.
        24
        Update: The Chief’s response to this recommendation references the Force
        Review Board and Tactical Review Committee, neither of which was convened to
        review any of the cases we evaluated for this report. The response also states that
        the Command Staff’s conclusion about a force incident should be discussed with
        involved officers and on-scene supervisors. Any such discussions or debriefings
        that occurred in the cases we reviewed were not documented in the case files, even
        in those cases where we believed some type of counseling or debriefing would
        seem appropriate. This is among the issues we discussed with the Chief and will
        revisit this in future audits to examine whether debriefings or counseling of
        officers following use of force reviews are documented.
        Recommendation 46: In addition to deciding whether the force was in policy,
        FPD should examine force incidents to determine whether there were issues of
        supervision, policy, or training that it should address.
        Update: The Command Staff meetings convened weekly examine force incidents
        holistically, with an eye on the performance of supervisors as well as the involved
        officers. Professional Standards Bureau staff also attends these meetings to
        address any training or policy issues that arise.
        Recommendation 47: FPD should develop protocols so that training staff
        reviews force incident investigations and provides meaningful input in an
        individual and systemic way to improve the training of officers.
        Update: The training sergeant reviews use of force investigations where there is
        an indication of a training issue. The sergeant is a participant in the Chief’s
        weekly Command Staff meetings and has the opportunity to provide input into any
        noted training deficiencies, either particular to that officer or Department-wide.
        Recommendation 48: FPD should consider designing protocols whereby
        significant force incidents and a sampling of less significant force incidents are
        reviewed by a force review committee. The force review committee should
        develop a written action plan for each force incident reviewed and ensure an
        effective feedback loop to present the results of any action plan back to the
        committee at a later time.
        Update: The Chief’s weekly Command Staff meetings include the IA sergeants,
        training sergeant and lieutenant, and the captains function as a de facto force
        review committee, evaluating force incidents with the goal of quickly identifying
        trends and training issues. This constitutes substantial compliance with our earlier
        25
        recommendation, though the committee should improve its documentation and
        tracking of command staff discussion, analysis, and outcomes.
        Recommendation 49: FPD should continue to use mechanisms, such as training
        bulletins or briefings to ensure that information learned is exported back to the line
        officers and first level supervisors in a meaningful way.
        Update: The inclusion of the Professional Standards Bureau staff in the review of
        force incidents and investigations facilitates the meaningful distribution of
        important lessons learned from various incidents. Among the cases we reviewed,
        we saw one case that resulted in Department-wide training on handcuffing
        techniques. In several other cases, the command-level review resulted in specific
        targeted training for the officers involved in particular incidents, most frequently
        with respect to a violation of the DAR policy.
        Foot Pursuits
        Two recommendations from our 2012 report address the issue of foot pursuits,
        which we noted preceded a number of the force incidents we reviewed. Because
        foot pursuits are inherently dangerous and present a heightened risk of harm to
        both officers and suspects, we encouraged the Department to look closely at its
        already comprehensive foot pursuit policy and to include a more formal review
        mechanism for these pursuits that would hold officers accountable for violation of
        the Department’s standards for performance.
        Recommendation 34: FPD should reexamine its foot pursuit policy to rule out
        particularly dangerous pursuits such as pursuits by non-uniformed personnel.
        Update: The Department amended its foot pursuit policy to include being nonuniformed
        with less available equipment on the list of those conditions for which
        officers should “consider alternatives to engaging in or continuing a foot pursuit”
        absent “exigent circumstances.” The policy stops short of ruling out pursuits by
        non-uniformed personnel or any other particularly dangerous pursuits, instead
        calling on officers to “consider alternatives.” We will continue to engage with the
        Department on this issue.
        Recommendation 35: FPD should develop protocols to more formally review
        foot pursuits and hold officers accountable when they engage in foot pursuits that
        are not consistent with Department standards.
        26
        Update: The Chief discusses all of the tactics surrounding a force incident at his
        weekly staff meeting, including any foot pursuit that may have preceded the force.
        However, the force investigations themselves generally contain no written analysis
        of the pursuit issues, and we did not review any cases in which an officer’s
        performance was evaluated for adherence to the Department’s policy enumerating
        guidelines for foot pursuits. This lack of attention and written analysis hinders our
        ability to assess the degree to which the Department has embraced this
        recommendation.
        27
        Transparency,
        Outreach, and
        Reform
        n the years that we have been reviewing and working with the FPD, the
        Department has made extraordinary efforts to increase the level of
        transparency of its operations, to reach out to and engage the Fullerton
        community on issues of greatest concern to community members, and to
        reform the way it trains its officers. We highlight some of these efforts here,
        to credit the Department for these efforts and to encourage it to maintain its
        progress.
        The Department’s cooperation with OIR Group, and its acceptance and
        publication of these reports, is a significant statement of its willingness to be open
        and transparent. Beyond that, it has gone further than most agencies and
        published on its website its policy manual as well as a regular update of statistics
        of its administrative investigation outcomes. Very few law enforcement agencies
        are willing to cast light on internal investigative processes, so the FPD stands out
        for its willingness to provide total number of investigations, broken down in
        several different ways – by types of cases, type of force used in force cases, and
        type of discipline received.
        The Department also recently formed a social media team with the goal of
        improving community engagement via postings on Facebook, Twitter, and
        I
        SECTION THREE
        28
        Instagram. The team operates around the clock, providing information on ongoing
        operations, crime trends, and other information that residents and business owner
        may find important.
        Many of our prior recommendations related to the way in which the Department
        trains its officers regarding the use of force, including instruction on which force
        options are authorized in particular situations, and efforts to reorient officer’s
        approach to the use of force by promoting tactical alternatives. To aid in these
        efforts, the Department has committed substantial resources to upgrade its training
        facilities, including a new video-based interactive training system that presents
        over 200 scenarios that officers must confront. The technology allows the
        scenario to change based on the tactics or commands the officer employs, creating
        as realistic a challenge as possible in a safe training environment.
        Similarly, the Department has created a new training room that allows officers to
        simulate entry scenarios and practice de-escalation techniques while deploying
        simunition weapons.4 Again, trainers may change the scenario and its outcome
        based on the officer’s responses, reinforcing positive behavior and highlighting
        tactical deficiencies. These upgrades in training facilities allow trainers to
        emphasize the importance of tactical alternatives to force, particularly deadly
        force, and to assess how well officers have incorporated those lessons into their
        performance. Training facilities and programs are only effective if officers have
        the opportunity to use them. The largest expense associated with training is the
        cost of paying officers to work an assignment behind someone who is at training.
        The Department’s has committed considerable resources to ensure that all its
        officers receive updated and ongoing training.
        Since 2011, the Department has shifted its approach to dealing with homeless
        individuals, most notably by dramatically increasing funding for its Homeless
        Liaison Officer program to address people’s immediate needs with the hope of
        moving them into housing. Rather than arresting people or simply moving them
        along, officers with the liaison program – in partnership with the Coast to Coast
        Foundation – have the tools and resources to connect them with basic goods and
        services, such as bus passes, water, food gift cards, clothing, or motel vouchers.
        The Department is understandably proud of the fact that over 170 previously
        4 Simunition weapons are actual firearms loaded with ammunition similar to paintballs
        that allow officers to safely train in live-fire scenarios.
        29
        homeless individuals have been reunited with family members or placed in
        housing due to this outreach program.
        The Department also recognized a need to shift the ways in which its officers
        communicate with people in mental health crises and ensured that every member
        received Crisis Intervention Team training, in which officers learn about major
        mental illnesses and acquire techniques for de-escalating situations involving
        individuals experiencing these symptoms. In addition, the Department has
        partnered with Orange County Mental Health to have an outreach clinician ride
        with FPD officers each week.
        The Department also has engaged in other significant community outreach efforts
        over the past five years, working hard to build relationships with community
        partners and to gain the trust of the public it serves. The Chief of Police worked
        with churches, schools, government leaders, businesses, services organizations,
        and residents to create service days called LOVE Fullerton. In its third year,
        nearly 3000 residents volunteered on over 70 projects, with the Chief serving as
        the local coordinator. Department members also spend considerable time reaching
        out to young people and their families to provide mentoring support, reduce
        delinquency, educate and prevent drug and alcohol use, limit gang interaction, and
        promote cyber safety through programs such as Lunch Bunch, School Attendance
        Review Board meetings, Richman Community Center Partnership, Teen and
        Parent Conferences, Las Mamas mentoring group, Team Kids, and the OC Gang
        Reduction Intervention Partnership.
        We recognize the Department’s efforts to improve the relationship between the
        police and the community through active engagement and increased transparency
        as evidence of the agency’s strong desire to move forward. The Department’s
        recognition of the importance of community partnerships as it engages in its own
        internal reform is a key to the success of those efforts.
        30
        Conclusion &
        Recommendations
        The recommendations we made in our 2012 report regarding the way the
        Department investigates and reviews uses of force by and allegations of
        misconduct against its officers have largely been adopted and are being followed
        by FPD personnel. The resulting investigations are complete and thorough and
        lack indication of bias. The review and disposition by Department executives,
        while not always well documented, appears to be thoughtful and inclusive of
        critical tactical issues as well as some tangential concerns. In reviewing the
        Department’s investigation and review of force incidents that do not generate
        Internal Affairs investigations – types of cases we did not examine in 2012 – we
        found a number of ways in which the Department can improve, and we make the
        following recommendations:
        1 Officers who witness a use of force should be required to prepare a
        supplemental report to describe what they witnessed.
        2 The sergeant preparing the Supervisor’s Use of Force/Prisoner Injury
        Review should be required to interview or get written statements from
        all non-FPD personnel who witnessed the incident, including all
        civilians and members of other law enforcement agencies.
        31
        3 In cases where the subject’s account of any force used varies
        significantly from the officer’s account, the reviewing sergeant should
        strive to resolve the conflict using all relevant investigative tools,
        including interviews of the involved or witness officers.
        4 In cases where a sergeant uses or directs a use of force, the
        Department should assign the task of preparing the Supervisor’s Use
        of Force/Prisoner Injury Review to an uninvolved sergeant or
        lieutenant.
        5 FPD should consider changing the way it documents force to include
        specific questions about threat perception, de-escalation efforts,
        adherence to force reporting policies, medical review, tactical
        concerns, and equipment issues that the sergeant would complete in
        lieu of the free form narrative of the incident.
        6 FPD should adopt a policy prohibiting a supervisor who was involved in
        or witness to a force incident from conducting an administrative
        investigation of that incident.

    4. Its surprising how many police drive around undercover, plain clothes. Ive been pulled over many times in Fullerton, always without cause, the most recent about a year ago….. outside the city limits, I was bullied for what reason I’m not sure.

  6. Why do we have to pay for the Behind the Badge FPD propaganda? By the way, the cartoonish cop from Thelma and Louise film has less of an attitude than most FPD cops

  7. Recently spoke to an FPD officer who said the day of Hughes’ going away “ceremony” he dispatched every officer (on duty) to the station to get dressed in Class A’s (shirt and tie). They were ordered to be at the ceremony while officers from
    Anaheim and Buena Park handled calls for service!!! Nothing like putting the citizens of Fullerton in jeopardy should something happen…. FFFF?-it would be interesting to here from someone who called for service, or received delayed service, only to be met by an Anaheim or BP officer…..I’m sure this could easily be confirmed by checking the dispatcher log or the daily log at the front desk(just saying)….. happy hunting.

    1. Additionally-how great would it be to get the “MDT” notes during that time frame knowing very well those “dayshift veteran” cops were voicing their disdain via the MDT’s…. And you damn well know the dispatchers communicated via CAD(computer aided dispatch) specific notes as to the “status” of each officer and why.

    2. Somehow it doesn’t surprise me that ex-Chief of Police Dan Hughes would have to pay for people to be at his going away party.

      Would have been nice if he would have done it with his own money though.

      However that’s also why no one would have come if it was on their own dime.

      This fable is loosely based on how officers in the FPD view being associated with Dan Hughes…

      A scorpion asks a frog to carry it across a river. The frog hesitates, afraid of being stung, but the scorpion argues that if it did so, they would both drown. Considering this, the frog agrees, but midway across the river the scorpion does indeed sting the frog, dooming them both. When the frog asks the scorpion why, the scorpion replies that it was in its nature to do so.

        1. What do snowflakes and Republicans have in common?

          They’re all white,they’re cold, and if you put enough of them together they’ll shut down the public schools!

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